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NOT KIDS ANYMORE: A NEED FOR
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE IN THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Abstract: This Note surveys the history of the juvenile justice system,
including the philosophy behind its formation and its similarities and
differences with the adult criminal system. Recently, many states have
implemented changes to their juvenile justice - systems. This Note
advocates a system like that of Massachusetts, where certain juvenile
defendants are automatically transferred to adult court, and where
other juvenile defendants, who remain in juvenile court but meet
certain requirements, may receive a blended juvenile and adult
sentence. This system retains the goal of rehabilitation of juvenile
delinquents while also focusing on punishment and deterrence.
INTRODUCTION
On November 17, 1999, a Michigan Circuit Court jury found
thirteen-year-old Nathaniel Abraham guilty of second-degree murder.'
Abraham was convicted of killing Ronnie Greene Jr.—a crime he
committed when he was only eleven years old. 2 Although tried in an
adult court, Abraham was sentenced by Judge Eugene Moore to juve-
nile detention until the age of twenty-one, at which point he auto-
matically will be released. 3
Abraham's case illustrates the current controversy over the most
effective way to deal with juvenile offenders. 4 The arrest rate for vio-
I See Keith Bradsher, Michigan Boy Who Killed at 11 is Convicted of Murder as Adult, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Bradsher, Michigan Boy]; William Claiborne, 13-
Year-Old Convicted in Shooting, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1999, at AS [hereinafter Claiborne, 13-
Year-Old].
2 See Claiborne, 13-Year-Old, supra note 1, at AS.
3 See Keith Bradsher, Boy Who Killed Gets 7 Years, N.Y. Tinos, Jan. 14, 2000, at Al [here-
inafter Bradsher, Boy Who Killed]; William Claiborne, Young Killer Sentenced to juvenile Facil-
ity, WASH. POST, jam 14, 2000, at A9 [hereinafter Claiborne, Young Killed.
4 See Bradsher, Michigan Boy, supra note 1, at Al; Claiborne, 13-Year-Old, supra note 1, at
AS. Statutes in each state determine, usually according to age, which youth fall under the
original jurisdiction of the juvenile court. See juveniles in Court, Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, at http://oklp.ncjrs.orgiojstatbb/CourtStatutes.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2001). Most states define a "juvenile" as a youth under the age of eighteen
at the time of the alleged offense or arrest. See id.
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lent crime among juveniles has risen 62% between 1988 and 1994. 5
Although arrests of juveniles fell 9% between 1995 and 1999, 17% of
all arrests in 1999 involved a juvenile.° In addition, the recent crimes
committed by juveniles are "altogether more vicious" than those the
juvenile court system was originally designed to face.? The media's
involvement in publicizing many of the violent crimes committed by
juveniles has sparked public demand for stricter penalties. 5 In re-
sponse, some politicians have promoted measures to "get tough" on
juvenile crime.° Indeed, United States Representative Bill McCollum
went so far as to say that "[On America today, no population poses a
greater threat to public safety than juvenile criminals:go Many state
legislatures have therefore enacted laws making it easier to try juve-
niles as adults." For example, in Michigan, jurisdiction over Abraham
was transferred from a juvenile court to an adult court under a 1997
statute allowing prosecutors to request that a juvenile be tried as an
adult for certain offenses, regardless of his or her age.I 2 Before that
statute was enacted, a juvenile had to be at least fourteen years old to
be tried—at the judge's discretion—as an adult."
On the other side of the debate over juvenile justice, some feel
that juvenile offenders still can be rehabilitated if treated as juveniles
5 See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFEND-
ERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 120 (2000) [hereinafter JuvENILE OFFENDERS].
6 See id. at 116,
7 See John Cloud et al„ For They Know Not What They Do? When and How Do Children
Know Right from Wrong? And How Can We Devise a Punishment to Fit Their Crime?, TIME, Aug.
24, 1998, at 64. When the first juvenile court was founded in Chicago in 1899, the crimes
juveniles were accused of committing were, for the most part, petty theft and truancy. See
id. A hundred years later, the "juvenile court system ... must cope with atrocities alto-
gether more vicious." See id. For example, in 1994, in Chicago, a ten-year-old boy and his
eleven-year-old friend tossed a five-year-old out a window. See id. Additionally, in 1998, two
Chicago juveniles (one only nine years old) beat a five-year-old to death. See id.
8 See Shannon F. McLatchey, Note, Juvenile Crime and Punishment: An Analysis of the "Get
Tough" Approach, 10 U. Fut.J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 401, 406 (1999).
9 See id.
10 Richard Lacayo & Sally B. Donnelly, Teen Crime Congress Wants to Crack Down on Juve-
nile Offenders. But Is Throwing Teens into Adult Courts—and Adult Prisons—the Best Way?, TIME,
July 21, 1997, at 26.
11 SeeMcLatchey, supra note 8, at 407.
12 See Bradsher, Michigan Boy, supra note 1, at Al. Michigan law, however, still requires
that a juvenile be at least seven years old in order to be prosecuted for a felony. See Richard
Willing, When Children Kill, Who Takes the Blame? Experts Examine Youths' Actions in Serious
Crimes, USA TODAY, Mar. 2, 2000, at 3A. According to the well-established common law,
children under the age of seven are presumed to be incapable of committing crimes be-
cause they do not understand the consequences of their actions. See id.
13 See Bradsher, Michigan Boy, supra note 1, at Al.
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rather than as adults and that "getting tough" on juvenile crime does
not provide the answer." For example, although Abraham was tried in
an adult court, Judge Moore believed that Abraham should be sen-
tenced as a juvenile." Affirming his faith in the ability of the juvenile
justice system to reform delinquents, Judge Moore called the Michi-
gan law authorizing transfer of juveniles to adult court "fundamen-
tally flawed."16 Similarly, Reverend Al Sharpton and Martin Luther
King III argued that it is unjust to sentence children as adults and or-
ganized a protest outside the Michigan courthouse where Abraham
was being tried." Additionally, Amnesty International USA featured
Abraham on the cover of its recent report on the juvenile justice sys-
tem and maintained that trying hint as an adult violated "interna-
tional human rights standards for the protection of children.""
The current controversy over juvenile justice results in part from
the fact that many states have shifted the focus of the juvenile justice
system from rehabilitation to punishment and deterrence." This Note
maintains that in order to help reduce violent juvenile crime, states
should continue to expand the focus of the juvenile justice system to
include punishment and deterrence in addition to the original goal
of rehabilitation. Thus, under certain circumstances, juvenile defen-
dants should be treated more like adults.
Part 1 of this Note describes the history of the juvenile justice sys-
tem, including the philosophy behind its formation and its similarities
and differences with the adult criminal system." Part I also examines
the general types of changes that many states have recently imple-
mented to the juvenile justice system. 21 Part II explores some alterna-
tives for addressing the juvenile justice controversy. 22 Part III advo-
cates a system like that of Massachusetts, where certain juvenile
14 See McLatchey, supra note 8, at 414-15; Bradslter, By Who Killed, supra note 3, at Al;
Orlandar Brand-Williams & Santiago Esparza, Groups join Protest of Abraham Conviction:
Pontiac Rally Is Planned on Day of Teen's. Sentence, Dar. NEws, Jan. 12,2000, at Cl •
n See Bradsher, Boy Who Killed, supra note 3, at Al.
it See id. Judge Moore not only expressed confidence in the ability of the juvenile jus-
tice system to rehabilitate Abraham, but also stressed that "sentencing Abraham as an adult
would destroy any hope for rehabilitation of the youth." See Claiborne, Young Killen supra
note 3, at A9.
17 See Brand-Williams & Esparza, supra note 14, at C1.
18 See Claiborne, I 3-Yea r-Old, supra note 1, at AS.
19 See Barry C. Feld, The juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense. Punishment, Treatment
and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821,822 (1998); McLatchey, supra note 8, at 406.
2° See infra notes 25-70 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 71-133 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 134-180 and accompanying text.
394	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 42:391
defendants are automatically transferred to adult court, and where
other juvenile defendants, who remain in juvenile court but meet cer-
tain requirements, may receive a blended juvenile and adult sen-
tence.23
 The Massachusetts system retains the goal of rehabilitation of
juvenile delinquents while also focusing on punishment and deter-
re nce.24
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Foundation of JuvenileJustice
Although the current juvenile justice system in many states now
closely resembles the adult criminal justice system, they remain two
separate systems of justice, founded on different philosophies. 25 Gen-
erally speaking, while the adult criminal justice system emphasizes the
punishment of criminals, the juvenile justice system is based on the
rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. 26 In the early twentieth century,
the Progressives began to perceive children in a new manner. 27 Indus-
trialization and modernization led to the view that children were
"corruptible innocents whose upbringing ... required greater struc-
ture than had previously been regarded as prerequisite to adult-
hood."28
 Social scientists reported that because children are not fully
developed, either mentally or physically, they are not accountable for
their actions in the same way as adults are accountable." Criminal
behavior by children, it was believed, resulted from external forces
such as impoverished living conditions or parental neglect." Juvenile
criminality was seen as a kind of youthful illness, which possibly could
be cured by relocating the juvenile to a better family life in a rural
23 See infra notes 181-247 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 181-297 and accompanying text.
25 See JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 85.
25 See Janet Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics offuvenile Court
Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927, 933-34 (1995).
2 See Feld, supra note 19, at 822.
23 See id. at 823. Industrialization changed the labor force in away that left fewer em-
ployment opportunities for juveniles. See Ainsworth, supra note 26, at 931. Jobs required
the skill and strength of older workers, and immigrants arrived to compete for these jobs.
See id. at 932. Thus, one consequence of the Progressive movement was the "postponement
of [young people's] attainment of full personhood within society." See id.
29 See Ainsworth, supra note 26, at 932-33; Danielle R. Oddo, Note, Removing
Confidentiality Protections and the "Get Tough" Rhetoric: What Has Gone Wrong with the Juvenile
Justice System?, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD U. 105, 114 (1998).
30 See Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine that Arrived at the Wrong Station: How to Get Juve-
nile justice Back on the Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401, 405 (1999).
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setting. 31 Thus, a separate justice system was established for juveniles
in order to protect them and to provide them with treatment to en-
able their return to society as productive citizens."
Illinois established the first juvenile court in the United States in
1899." By 1925, all but two states had established juvenile courts, and
the laws establishing these courts emphasized rehabilitation of juve-
nile offenders." Judge R.S. Tuthill, the first juvenile court judge of
Cook County, Illinois, prioritized the court's responsibilities as first to
the welfare of the child and then to the welfare of the community. 35
Consistent with this view, the early juvenile court thus focused on the
individual offender, not on the offense, and acted like a parent in its
treatment of juveniles. 36 Its main goal was "not to ascertain whether
the child was 'guilty' or 'innocent,' but 'what is he, how has he be-
come what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the
interest of the state to save him from a downward career.'"37
For the first half of the twentieth century, most states structured
juvenile courts to support the goal of rehabilitation through individu-
alized treatment. 38 First, the juvenile court retained exclusive jurisdic-
tion over all juveniles under the age of eighteen, and a juvenile court
could waive its jurisdiction and transfer a juvenile to an adult court
only upon determining that waiver was in the "best interests of the
child and public."39 Second, juvenile court proceedings were often
confidential, and the public • were excluded from attendance."
Confidentiality, it was believed, helped prevent children from being
stigmatized as criminals, which could minimize future educational
and employment opportunities. 41 Third, juvenile court proceedings
were more informal than adult court proceedings." Because the
31 See Feld, supra note 19, at 824; Zierdt, supra note 30, at 406; Oddo, supra note 29, at
107.
32 Seejuvutot.E OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 86.
" See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 406.
34 .vvc—JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 86.
" See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 407-08.
36 See id. at 408. The rationale for the court acting like a parent was the British doc-
trine of parens patrie, the State as parent. Sre JuvENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 86. Ac-
cording to this doctrine, the State was responsible for protecting children whose parents
did not provide necessary care. See id.
37
 Oddo, supra note 29, at 107.
38 SeeAinsworth, supra note 26, at 927; Feld, supra note 19, at 821.
39 See juVENILE OFFENDERS, Slipra note 5, at 86.
4° See Feld, supra note 19, at 825.
41 See id.; Oddo, supra note 29, at 107.
42 See JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 87.
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court itself aimed to protect the child, states considered many adult
due process protections, such as the right to an attorney, unneces-
sary.° Finally, in sentencing juvenile delinquents, juvenile court
judges had broad discretion to tailor the treatment to the individual
child." Thus, "sentences" were indeterminate and lasted only until
the child was rehabilitated or, at the latest, until the age of twenty-
one.°
Beginning in the 1960s, however, concern surfaced that the juve-
nile justice system was not achieving its goal of rehabilitating juvenile
delinquents. 46
 Some of the concern related to the fact that indeter-
minate sentences led to a "growing number of juveniles institutional-
ized indefinitely in the name of treatment."47
 Additionally, concerns
that rehabilitation efforts were failing were bolstered by recidivism
rates of juveniles who most likely were released from juvenile deten-
tion based on the conclusion that they were "cured." 48 Thus, while
continuing to support rehabilitation as the ultimate goal, many con-
cluded that the lack of effective rehabilitation was due to the informal
nature of the juvenile justice system and the wide discretion given to
juvenile court judges.49
 As a result of these concerns, the United
States Supreme Court heard several cases regarding the nature of ju-
venile court proceedings and instituted many of the due process pro-
tections required in the adult system.5°
In 1966, in Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court held that in
order to transfer a juvenile defendant to adult court, a judge must
provide the opportunity for a hearing and must accompany a waiver
of jurisdiction order with a statement listing the reasons for transfer.'"
The Court then listed eight factors a juvenile court judge must con-
43
 See id.; Zierdt, supra note 30, at 408.
44 See JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 87. Sentences ranged from a warning to
probation supervision to training-school confinement. See id. Traditionally, in the juvenile
justice system, defendants are not "found guilty" but rather are "adjudicated delinquent."
See Ainsworth, supra note 26, at 934.
43
 See JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 87.
46
 See id.; Feld, supra note 19, at 826; Zierdt, supra note 30, at 409.
47 See JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 87.
48 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967). A study by the Stanford Research Institute for
the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia found that in 1965, 61%
of juvenile defendants had been previously referred at least once and 42% had been pre-
viously referred at least twice. See id.
46 See IselcLatchey, supra note 8, at 403.
50 See JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 87, 90; Oddo, supra note 29, at 109-10.
SI See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966).
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Sider in deciding whether to transfer a juvenile to adult court. 52 These
factors included the seriousness of the offense, the maturity of the
juvenile, the previous record, if any, of the juvenile and the likelihood
that the juvenile would be rehabilitated under the juvenile systern. 55
In deciding to require these elements of due process, the Court rea-
soned that juvenile court judges are not licensed to act with "proce-
dural arbitrariness."54 Fearing the knee-jerk transfer of juveniles who
might otherwise be rehabilitated in the juvenile justice system, the
Court found that when such a "critically important" decision was at
stake, transfer hearings and statements of the reasons for transfer
were necessary. 55 The Court emphasized the serious consequences of
transferring a juvenile to adult court, which in Kent could have ex-
posed the defendant to the possibility of the death sentence rather
than a juvenile sentence of up to five years of rehabilitative treat-
ment.56 The Court concluded that "society's special concern for chil-
dren" does not permit juvenile defendants to be transferred to adult
court without these due process protections. 57
In 1967, in In re Gault, the Supreme Court held that at juvenile
delinquency proceedings, a juvenile has a right to counsel, a right to
cross-examine witnesses, a right against self-incrimination and a right
to be notified, along with his or her parents, of the pending charges. 58
Noting the lack of these protections in juvenile proceedings, the
Court quoted the Chairman of the Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile
Court Judges: "Unfortunately, loose procedures, high-handed meth-
ods and crowded court calendars . . . all too often, have resulted in
depriving some juveniles of fundamental rights that have resulted in a
denial of due process."59 The Court then connected the lack of due
process protections in the juvenile justice system with the failure of
rehabilitation as evidenced by the recent high rates of recidivism
52 See id. at 566-67.
55 See id. The other four factors were whether the alleged offense was committed in a
violent manner; whether the alleged offense was committed against persons or against
property; whether there was evidence upon which a Grand Jury could return an indict-
ment; and whether it would be desirable to try the entire offense in one court when the
juvenile's associates in the alleged offense were adults who would be charged in adult
court. See id. at 567.
" See id. at 554-55.
55 See id. at 553.
6 See Kent, 383 U.S. at 553-54.
57 See id. at 554.
" See Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 41, 55, 56-57.
59 See Id. at 19.
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among juveniles. 60
 The Court explained that resistance to the reha-
bilitative treatment provided by the juvenile justice system might stem
from perceptions of unfair treatment in courts where procedures
were informal but sentences severe. 61
 By instituting these due process
protections, the Court aimed to restore juveniles' faith in the system
and thereby enable the system to more effectively attain its goal of
rehabilitating juvenile offenders. 62
Despite the similarities now shared by the juvenile and adult
courts, the juvenile justice system retains several unique features
reflecting its initial goals of individualized treatment and rehabilita-
tion.63
 For example, although the Supreme Court added many due
process protections to the juvenile justice system, the Court refused to
require structural changes it believed would destroy the unique
benefits of the juvenile justice system." As a result, juveniles are not
afforded a right to a jury trial in all states, unlike adults who have a
constitutional right to a trial by jury.° The Court found that juries
"could be disruptive to the informal atmosphere of the juvenile court,
tending to make it more adversarial."" In addition, the Supreme
Court held that juveniles may be detained without bail pending adju-
dication because preventive detention protects the juvenile and soci-
ety and is not intended to punish the juvenile. 67 Adult defendants,
however, have a right to apply for bond or bail release se
 Finally, the
Supreme Court decisions did not address the disposition phase of ju-
venile court proceedings, and consequently, juvenile court judges re-
tain a broad range of sentencing authority, as distinct from adult
court judges. 69
 The sanctions that juvenile court judges impose may
be indeterminate and based on both legal and non-legal factors, un-
6° See id. at 22, 26.
Si
 See id. at 26. The Court quoted the National Crime Commission Report: "[Me in-
formal procedures may themselves constitute a further obstacle to effective treatment
of the delinquent to the extent that they engender in the child a sense of injustice pro-
voked by seemingly all-powerful and challengeless exercise of authority by judges ." See
id. at 26 n.37.
62 See id. at 22, 26.
83
 See JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 92.
6'1 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 22.
65 SeeJUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 92.
66
 Gault, 387 U.S. at 22.
67 See id.
68 See JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 95.
69 See id. at 96; Zierdt, supra note 30, at 409.
2001]	 Punishment, Deterrence and juvenile Justice	 399
like adult sentences, which are usually determinate and based on the
severity of the current offense and the criminal's prior history."
B. Recent Changes in Juvenile Justice
In the 1990s, many states, responding to public concern over in-
cidents of violent crime committed by juveniles, moved beyond the
Supreme Court's changes to the structure of the juvenile justice sys-
tem by amending their juvenile justice laws to reflect a greater em-
phasis on punishment and deterrence and less of a focus on the re-
habilitation of the individual juvenile. 71 States' recent revisions to
juvenile justice laws have taken several different forms." Many state
laws now provide for an increase in transfers of jurisdiction over juve-
nile defendants front juvenile court to adult court, an expansion of
the types of sentences juvenile defendants may receive, and a reduc-
tion in the level of confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings."
One major change to the juvenile justice system has been the in-
crease in transfers of jurisdiction from juvenile court to adult court,
where punishments often are more severe and less individualized. 74
Between 1992 and 1997, forty-four states and the District of Columbia
enacted legislation expanding the transfer of jurisdiction over juve-
niles." Several states did so by lowering the minimum age at which a
juvenile court may waive jurisdiction." In Missouri, for example, in
1996, the legislature lowered the minimum age for transfer from four-
teen to twelve.77 In 1997, Indiana lowered the minimum age for trans-
fer from sixteen to ten. 78 As of 1997, twenty-two states and the District
of Columbia no longer impose any minimum age requirement for at
least one method of transferring jurisdiction to adult court. 79
70 SeeJUVENILE OFFENDERS, Supra note 5, at 96.
71 See id. at 89; Feld, supra note 19, at 822; Zierdt, supra note 30, at 415. These changes
illustrate a desire to hold juveniles accountable for their actions. See Zierdt, supra note 30,
at 415.
72 SeeJUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 89.
73 See id.; Zierdt, supra note 30, at 414,420.
74 SeeJUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 103; McLatchey, supra note 8, at 407.
73 SeefliVeDileS in Court, supra note 4.
76 See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 419.
77 See id.
76 See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-4 (Michie 1997). The minimum age of ten for trans-
fers of juveniles to adult court applies only to juveniles charged with acts that would be
considered murder if committed by an adult. See id.
SeeJUVENILE OFFENDERS, Stipra note 5, at 106.
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In addition to lowering the age at which jurisdiction over a juve-
nile may be transferred to adult court, state legislatures also have ex-
panded the types of transfer mechanisms available to juvenile courts."
Recently, states have included not only traditional judicial waivers of
jurisdiction, where the juvenile court judge may transfer the juvenile
at the judge's discretion, but also, under certain circumstances, waiver
at the discretion of the prosecutor or, alternatively, mandatory waiver
required by specific legislation.° These prosecutorial and legislative
waivers of jurisdiction to adult court, moreover, are largely a result of
legislators' tough-crime measures and illustrate the trend of imposing
more punishment on juveniles in an effort to deter juveniles from
committing violent crime. 82
Under judicial waiver—the most traditional and still most com-
mon method of transfer used by states—the juvenile court judge re-
tains the authority to waive jurisdiction over the juvenile and transfer
him or her to adult court." Most statutes defining judicial waiver limit
the judge's decision to juveniles of a minimum age who have been
charged with specific offenses.84
 For example, New Jersey allows judi-
cial waiver of juveniles at least fourteen years old who have been
charged with murder or certain person, property, drug or weapon
offenses. 85
 Most statutes also enumerate several factors that the juve-
nile judge must consider in making the decision to transfer a juve-
nile." Some states leave the final waiver decision entirely to the dis-
cretion of the judge and provide factors for the judge to consider.
Others, such as California and Minnesota, create a presumption of
transfer for certain crimes, with the juvenile bearing the burden of
rebutting that presumption.°
88 See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 415-18.
81 See JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 102.
82
 See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 415-16; McLatchey, supra note 8, at 406-07.
83
 SeeJUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 102-03. Judicial waiver is available in the
District of Columbia and all states except Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Mexico and New
York. See id. at 102.
84 See id. at 103.
88 See id. at 104.
88 See Id. at 103. Judicial waiver statutes usually require the judge to consider the seri-
ousness of the offense, the age of the offender, the juvenile's previous record and the
amenability of the juvenile to rehabilitative treatment. See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 418.
87 See JuvENLE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 103; Zierdt, supra note 30, at 418-19. In
California, a presumption of transfer exists for twenty-eight offenses, including murder,
robbery with a dangerous weapon, sexual crimes and kidnapping. See Zierdt, supra note 30,
at 418. In Minnesota, a presumption of transfer exists for a juvenile who is at least sixteen
years old and is charged with "any felony offense while using 
... a fire-arm." See id. at 419.
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Another method of transferring jurisdiction over juveniles to
adult court relies upon the initiative of the prosecutor. 88 Under these
statutes, jurisdiction rests concurrently with the juvenile and adult
criminal courts, and the prosecutor, with little statutory guidance,
may decide where to pursue the case. 89 Most statutes authorizing
prosecutorial waiver limit it to serious offenses. 9° For example, Florida
prosecutors may file directly in adult court for cases involving juve-
niles who are at least sixteen years old and are charged with a misde-
meanor (if they have a prior adjudication) or a felony. 91 Florida
prosecutors also may file directly in adult court for cases involving ju-
veniles who are at least fourteen years old and who are charged with
murder or certain person, property or weapon offenses.° Although
only a few states authorize prosecutorial waiver, prosecutors in those
states transfer many juveniles to adult court."
A third mechanism for transferring jurisdiction over juveniles to
criminal court is legislative waiver, under which state statutes exclude
certain juveniles from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court alto-
gether." Although this type of waiver is not as common among states
as judicial waiver, it accounts for the largest number of juveniles tried
as adults." Legislative waiver statutes usually require automatic trans-
fer if the defendant has attained a specific age and is accused of a
crime specified in the statute." For example, in Massachusetts, juris-
diction over juveniles between the ages of fourteen and seventeen ac-
cused of committing murder in the first or second degree exists only
in adult criminal court.97
States not only are expanding ways to transfer jurisdiction, but
also are broadening the types of sentences juvenile offenders may re-
88 SeeJuveniles in Court, supra note 4. As of 1997, this method of transferring juveniles
to adult court is allowed in fourteen states and the District of Columbia. See id.
89 SeeJUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 105; Juveniles in Court, supra note 4.
99 SeejUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 105.
91 See id.
92 See
95 See id. In Florida, for example, approximately 5000 juveniles are transferred to adult
court each year by prosecutorial waiver. SeCJUVENILE OFFENDERS, SUP/a note 5, at 105.
94 See JuvENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 102.
95 See id. at 103, 106. As of 1997, legislative waiver existed in only twenty-eight states, in
contrast to judicial waiver, which existed in all but four gates. See id. at 104, 106.
98 See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 415.
97 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 74 (1996). Oregon has gone even further and re-
quires automatic waiver ofjuveniles age fifteen to seventeen charged with aggravated mur-
der, attempt or conspiracy to commit murder, manslaughter, assault, kidnapping, rape,
sodomy, unlawful sexual penetration, sexual abuse, robbery, compelling prostitution and
arson. See OR. REV. STAT. § 137.707 (1999).
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ceive, whether tried in a juvenile or adult court. 98 By imposing more
severe sanctions on juveniles for certain crimes, states have made pun-
ishment and deterrence the focus of their juvenile justice systems."
States have expanded the types of dispositions and sentences imposed
on juvenile offenders in four ways)" First, many states permit the ex-
tension of juvenile court dispositions until the juvenile is twenty-one
years old)" Traditionally, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court lasted
only until the juvenile turned eighteen)" In Arkansas, for example,
the prosecutor may request extended jurisdiction in the sentencing of
juveniles who were thirteen years old or younger at the time of the
offense and who are charged with capital murder or murder in the
first degree)" Arkansas prosecutors may also request extended juris-
diction in the sentencing of juveniles who were fourteen or fifteen
years old at the time of the offense and who are charged with certain
enumerated crimes)"
Second, juvenile courts in many states now issue more determi-
nate dispositions based upon the nature of the offense, as specified by
statute)" Traditionally, because juvenile court dispositions focused
primarily on rehabilitation and the individual needs of the juvenile,
dispositions varied in both severity and duration)" The trend of be-
ing "tough on crime," however, has led to more uniform, statutorily-
defined sentences for juveniles that are based primarily on the type of
offense committed, in an effort to punish the juvenile and to deter
future juvenile offenders. 107 For example, from 1992 through 1997,
sixteen states added or strengthened statutes requiring juvenile courts
to impose mandatory minimum confinement for juvenile defendants
adjudicated delinquent of certain violent crimes)" Similarly, in Texas,
" See Catili J. Hunt, Note, Juvenile Sentencing: Effects of Recent Punitive Sentencing Legisla-
tion on Juvenile Offenders and a Proposal for Sentencing in the Juvenile Court, 19 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J.621,632-33 (1999); see a/SO JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 108.
99
	 OFFENDERS, Mira note 5, at 108.
100 See infra notes 101-122 and accompanying text. "Sentences" imposed on juveniles
adjudicated delinquent are referred to as "dispositions." See JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra
note 5, at 96.
101 SeeJUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 108.
102
 See id. at 86. Between 1992 and 1997, seventeen states extended the possible dura-
tion of juvenile court dispositions to age twenty-one. See id. at 108.
0' See S.B. 505, § 1,1999 Ark. Acts 1192.
104
 See id.
102 See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 420; Hunt, supra note 98, at 640-41.
106 See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 420.
107
 See id.; see aLtaiuvENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 108.
108 occv^^ JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 108.
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if a court adjudicates a juvenile delinquent of at least one of fourteen
statutorily-defined felonies, the court may commit the juvenile to the
Texas Youth Commission with a possible transfer to adult prison. 109
The adult prison sentence may consist of up to ten, twenty or forty
years depending on the offense."°
Third, many states allow juvenile offenders to receive adult pun-
ishment." Naturally, if jurisdiction over a juvenile is transferred to
adult court and the juvenile is found guilty of the offense, the court
may impose upon the juvenile the adult sanction appropriate for the
offense." 2 In addition, in New Mexico, even if jurisdiction over a ju-
venile has not been transferred, a juvenile court judge may invoke an
adult sentence on a juvenile delinquent." New Mexico provides the
juvenile court discretion to impose either an adult sentence or juve-
nile sanctions on a youthful offender. 114 To impose an adult sentence,
the court must find that the juvenile is not amenable to treatment or
rehabilitation in the juvenile facilities."
Fourth, many states permit courts to impose blended sentences
on juvenile offenders."6 Through blended sentencing, an adult or
juvenile court with jurisdiction over a juvenile offender 'nay impose a
sentence consisting of both juvenile and adult sanctions. 117 For in-
stance, in Michigan, an adult court judge may impose either a juvenile
disposition, an adult criminal sentence (if it would best serve the in-
terests of the public), or a blended sentence combining juvenile and
adult sanctions—such as juvenile detention with a suspended adult
sentence." The suspended adult sentence, however, may only be im-
posed if the juvenile has not been reformed by the juvenile system by
109
	
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 53.045, 54.04 (Vernon 2000).
11° See id. § 54.04. The adult prison sentence may not he more than ten years for a fel-
ony of the third degree, not more than twenty years for a felony of the second degree and
not more than for years for a felony in the first degree, a capital felony or an aggravated
controlled substance felony. See id.
111 SeeflUVENH.E OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 108.
112 See Hunt, supra note 98, at 633.
113 See JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, al 108.
114 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-20 (Michie 1978).
116 See id. In order to make these findings, the judge must consider eight factors listed
in the statute. See id.
116 SCeJUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 108.
117 See Hunt, supra note 98, at 639; see aisa juvENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 108.
11B See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.18 (West 1993); 1999 Mich, Legis. Serv. 86
(West).
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the time that he or she is twenty-one years old. 119 Juvenile court judges
may also issue blended sentences. 12° For example, in Kansas, if an ex-
tended jurisdiction juvenile is adjudicated delinquent, a juvenile
court must impose a sentence of juvenile detention coupled with a
suspended adult sentence.'" The juvenile will only serve the sus-
pended sentence if he or she violates conditions of the juvenile deten-
tion or re-offends. 122
In addition to expanding the types of sanctions imposed on juve-
nile offenders, many states have reduced the level of confidentiality
involved in juvenile court proceedings. 125 Traditionally, juvenile court
proceedings and records remained closed to the public in an effort to
keep the identity of juveniles confidential and to protect them from
being labeled as criminals. 124 Anonymity, however, increased the pub-
lic's perception that the juvenile court system was too lenient in its
sentencing. 125 State legislatures responded by requiring that juvenile
records and proceedings be more open, thereby providing less pro-
tection to juveniles and creating a more punitive juvenile justice sys-
tem. 126 Statutes in forty-seven states and the District of Columbia now
allow information in juvenile court records to be released to at least
one of several sources: prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, social
services agencies, schools, victims or the general public.'" Although
access still may be restricted to certain parts of the record or made
available only by a court order, state legislation has significantly
eroded the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings. 128
There are several ways in which statutes have mandated that ju-
venile proceedings be more open to members of the public, but "in
general, the more serious the crime, the less protection is afforded to
119 See § 712A.18. An adult sentence provides additional punishment for the juvenile
delinquent; even a suspended adult sentence, it is argued, helps deter other juveniles from
conunitting crimes. See Hunt, supra note 98, at 633, 634, 670, 673.
120
 SeeJUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 108.
121 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-16,126 (Stipp. 1999). An extended jurisdiction juvenile is
a juvenile who was age fourteen, fifteen, sixteen or seventeen at the time of the offense
and who meets one of the following two conditions: The juvenile must he charged with
either an offense that would be considered a felOny if committed by an adult or an offense
committed while in possession of a firearm; or the juvenile must be charged with a felony
after being adjudicated delinquent in a prior juvenile proceeding. See id.
122 see
us See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 420.
124 See id
125 See id. at 420-21.
126 See id. at 421; Oddo, supra note 29, at 119.
127 SeejUVENILE OFFENDERS, Supra note 5, at 101.
129 See id.
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a juvenile's confidentiality." 129 For example, all juvenile proceedings
in Maryland remain open to the general public if they involve of-
fenses that are considered felonies when committed by an adult.'"
Cases involving offenses that are misdemeanors when committed by
an adult may be closed to the general public but only at the discretion
of the judge."' Some states, moreover, require the juvenile court to
release to schools the names of juveniles who have committed violent
crhnes. 132 In addition, in forty-two states, names of juvenile defendants
and occasionally pictures and court records may be released to the
media.'"
II. ALTERNATIVES FOR ADDRESSING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
CONTROVERSY
Many scholars agree that the juvenile justice system is not dealing
effectively with juvenile crime. 134 Scholars disagree, however, about
the effectiveness of the state reforms initiated as part of the recent
national trend to shift the focus of the juvenile justice system from
rehabilitation to punishment and deterrence.'" The general debate
on how to reform the treatment of juvenile offenders has produced
three main alternatives.'"
One proposed alternative is to abolish the juvenile justice system,
thereby ending the separation between the juvenile and criminal jus-
tice systems,"" Abolitionists maintain that the current juvenile justice
syStem contains serious shortcomings. 138 They claim that the proce-
dural protections afforded by the juvenile court are inferior to those
provided in adult criminal court.'" Indeed, according to abolitionists,
juveniles commonly are represented by lawyers with little experience
and, in many states, are not entitled to jury triais.140
 Abolitionists also




1" See id. at 116.
is3 See JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 101.
134 See Ainsworth, supra note 26, at 927; Zierdt, supra note 30, at 427, 434.
135 See Ainsworth, supra note 26, at 936; Feld, supra note 19, at 822; Zierdt, supra note
30, at 402; Hunt, supra note 98, at 668.
176 See infra notes 137-180 and accompanying text.
137 SeeAinsworth, supra note 26, at 929; Feld, supra note 19, at 822.
138 See Ainsworth, supra note 26, at 927.
139 See id. at 928. One scholar has gone so far as to say that "the juvenile court is now a
deficient criminal court." See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 69 (1997).
190
 SeeAinsworth, supra note 26, at 928.
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claim that juvenile offenders do not receive individualized disposi-
tions because the juvenile justice system does not have the resources
to provide specialized treatment."' Further, abolitionists argue that
incarceration of juveniles is viewed as punishment, even if imposed in
the name of treatment. 142
 Finally, supporters of this alternative believe
that the current two-tiered justice system, where cases are allocated
merely on the basis of an "age of majority," cannot be effective be-
cause all children do not mature at the same age. 145
In addition to arguing that the shortcomings of the current juve-
nile justice system have prevented it from achieving its original goals,
abolitionists also point out that the recent reforms have brought the
juvenile justice system closer in resemblance to the adult system.'"
The due process protections required by the Supreme Court have
added formality to a juvenile justice process envisioned by the Pro-
gressives as individualized and procedurally informal. 145 In addition,
the shift in focus from rehabilitation to punishment of juvenile delin-
quents illustrates the inadequacy of the due process protections in
place and raises the need to provide juveniles with the same proce-
dural protections adults receive. 146
Thus, abolitionists argue that because the current juvenile justice
system is not achieving its original goals and the recent reforms have
made it resemble the adult system, the juvenile system should be abol-
ished in favor of one unified system. 147 Although abolitionists propose
one justice system applicable to all defendants, they also recognize
that the present adult criminal system has its own shortcomings. 148
Thus, abolitionists favor creation of a new system altogether, under
which each defendant would be evaluated individually, with age as
one of the factors influencing sentencing. 149
Supporters of a second alternative for dealing with young of-
fenders also express concern over the recent reforms to the juvenile
141 See id. at 928-29.
142 See id. at 928.
143
 See id. at 948.
144
 See Feld, supra note 19, at 821.
145 See id.
146 See id. at 822.
147
 SeeAinsworth, supra note 26, at 927-31; Feld, supra note 19, at 821-22.
145 See Ainsworth, supra note 26, at 931; McLatchey, supra note 8, at 417. The adult
criminal justice system is overcrowded and justice is dispensed through waivers and pleas
negotiated by defense attorneys who are often less than zealotts ... advocates." See
McLatchey, supra note 8, at 418 n.190.
149 SeeAinsworth, supra note 26, at 931; McLatchey, supra note 8, at 417.
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justice system and focus on community-based treatment programs in
an effort to prevent juveniles from committing crimes.'" One scholar
maintains that recent violent crimes committed by juveniles have
been dramatized by the media and that making the juvenile court
more like an adult court in response to these few crimes will prevent
society from deterring juvenile crime. 151 Supporters of community-
based treatment programs argue that changing the focus of the juve-
nile justice system to punishment and imprisonment is a reactive re-
sponse, rather than a preventive response, to juvenile crime. 152 They
maintain that imprisonment will not deter delinquents from re-
offending or prevent others from committing crimes, because it does
not take into account the troubling backgrounds of many of these ju-
veniles.'" Supporters of this approach argue that in order to reduce
crimes committed by juveniles, the juvenile justice system should in-
clude community-based treatment programs that take into account
the causes of delinquency. 154
Advocates of this alternative point out that some of the primary
causes of delinquency have been identified. 155 Juveniles often commit
crimes as a reaction to their environment, which most likely includes
impoverishment, sub-standard housing and health care, inadequate
education, and domestic problems. 156 According to statistics on incar-
cerated juveniles, the majority of violent juvenile offenders have wit-
nessed physical violence and have themselves been victims of abuse. 157
To deter juveniles from re-offending and to prevent other juveniles
from committing crimes, supporters argue, the juvenile justice system
should include treatment programs that focus on the individual child
in his or her community. 158 These programs will rehabilitate juvenile
delinquents more effectively and protect society from juvenile
crime.159 Supporters point out that this approach remains consistent
150 See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 434.
151 See id. at 402, 434.
152 See Abbe Smith, They Dream of Growing Older: On Kids & Crime, 3613.0. L. REV. 953,
1009-10 (1995); Zierdt, supra note 30, at 402.
153 See Smith, supra note 152, at 1009-10.
154 See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 426, 427.
155 See id. at 427.
m See id. at 426-27.
157 See id. at 427. In fact, in 1997, "75 percent of violent juvenile offenders suffered se-
rious abuse by a family member, 80 percent witnessed physical violence from beatings and
killings, 50 percent came from homes with one parent families, [and' over 25 percent had
a parent who abused drugs or alcohol." See id.
me See id. at 427, 434.
159 See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 434.
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with the mission of the juvenile justice system, which was founded on
the idea that a juvenile can be rehabilitated most effectively within the
community.m
According to its supporters, a community-based treatment pro-
gram would maintain the traditional two-tiered structure of the justice
system (adult and juvenile) but would replace incarceration of juve-
niles with a community model in an effort to rehabilitate juveniles)"
The community model would be organized similarly to intensive pro-
bation and would thus provide for the close monitoring of the juve-
nile through "continuous case management; emphasis on reintegra-
tion and reentry services; opportunities for youth achievement and
involvement in program decision making; clear and consistent conse-
quences for misconduct; enriched educational and vocational pro-
gramming; and a variety of forms of individual, group, and family
counseling matched to youth's needs." 162 Although these programs
are expensive, research shows that they could be less expensive than
incarceration)"
A third alternative for addressing the juvenile justice controversy
consists of implementing a blended sentencing option in the juvenile
courts of those states lacking this option)" Supporters of this ap-
proach maintain that states that treat juveniles completely as adults,
either through legislative transfers of juveniles to adult court or
through entirely adult sanctions imposed by juvenile or adult courts,
have gone too far)" These reforms, it is argued, place too much em-
phasis on punishment whereas blended sentencing provides a way to
keep the focus on the rehabilitation of juveniles and make the reha-
bilitation process more effective. 166
Like those advocating abolition of the juvenile justice system,
supporters of blended sentencing believe that the current two-tiered
justice system has not reduced juvenile crime or fostered the rehabili-
tation of juvenile offenders. 167 In addition, both abolitionists and sup-
porters of blended sentencing agree that a main problem is that an
"age of majority" division between juvenile and adult court jurisdic-
160 See id. at 433.
161 See id.
162 See id. at 429, 433.
las See id. at 428.
164 See Hunt, supra note 98, at 668. As of 1997, blended sentencing options were avail-
able in twenty-two states. SeduvEnutx OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 108.
10 See Hunt, supra note 98, at 668, 670-71, 680.
166 See id. at 668, 670.
167 See Ainsworth, supra note 26, at 948; Hunt, supra note 98, at 668, 670-71.
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tion does not focus adequately on the individual situations of juvenile
delinquents. 168 Supporters of blended sentencing, however, reject the
abolitionists' unified system and instead propose a three-tiered sys-
tem, with one tier as a "transitional component between the juvenile
and adult systems."169 This transitional "third tier" would identify cer-
tain juveniles eligible to receive blended sentences and thus would
only apply at the sentencing phase.I 7° According to the supporters of
blended sentencing, juveniles between the ages of fourteen and sev-
enteen who are charged with a felony and who were previously adju-
dicated delinquent of a felony offense would be eligible to receive
blended sentencing. 171 Under this approach, then, juvenile court
judges may impose a sentence consisting of detention at a state youth
facility until the juvenile reaches age twenty-one, combined with a
suspended adult prison sentence to be served if the juvenile re-
offends, has not been rehabilitated, or does not comply with the con-
ditions of the juvenile sentence.I 72
Supporters of the blended sentencing approach maintain that
unlike legislative transfer and wholly adult sentences, blended sen-
tencing does not over-punish because it bases the need to implement
an adult sentence on the juvenile's individual rehabilitation progress,
not entirely on the nature of the offense. 173 Proponents of blended
sentencing believe this approach will rehabilitate juvenile offenders
more effectively. 174 Because it applies to repeat juvenile offenders, it
offers them one more chance to reform within the juvenile system." 5
The suspended adult sentence, moreover, provides added incentive
for the juvenile to rehabilitate and to abide by the terms of the juve-
nile sentence—thereby avoiding the adult sentence altogether. 176 Ad-
ditionally, blended sentencing broadens the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court so that a juvenile offender has until age twenty-one, instead
of eighteen, to rehabilitate)" Supporters also argue that this transi-
tional sentence will separate those who committed a crime because of
168 See Hunt, supra note 98, at 671.
109 See Ainsworth, supra note 26, at 948-49; see also Hunt, supra note 98, at 668, 671;
McLatchey, supra note 8, at 420.
170 Seellunt, supra note 98, at 671.
171 See id. at 669.
172 See id. at 669-70.
173 See id. at 668, 670-71.
174 See id. at 668, 673.
175 See McLatchey, supra note 8, at 420.
176 See Hunt, supra note 98, at 673.
177 See id.
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immaturity or peer pressure and are therefore more likely to reform
from those who "are prone to being criminals" and are therefore less
likely to reform. 178
 This approach, it is further argued, will more ade-
quately protect the public because, insofar as rehabilitation will be
more effective, those detained will be less likely to re-offend. 179 Fur-
thermore, those who cannot be rehabilitated—even after two chances
to reform—will then be incarcerated so that they are not back out on
the streets. 18°
III. IN SUPPORT OF TREATING JUVENILES AS ADULTS
In the wake of recent incidents of juvenile violence—such as the
shootings by juveniles in Littleton, Colorado, where fifteen were killed
and twenty-three injured, and Jonesboro, Arkansas, where five were
killed and ten wounded—the public is justifiably concerned about its
safety. ist Indeed, Andrew Golden and Mitchell Johnson were only
eleven and thirteen, respectively, on March 24, 1998, when they
pulled a fire alarm at their Arkansas middle school and hid in the
woods near the school, dressed in camouflage. 182 As students and
teachers exited the school, the two boys opened fire, killing five peo-
ple and wounding ten more.'" Because they were under age fourteen
at the time of the shooting, Arkansas law prevented jurisdiction over
Golden and Johnson from being transferred to adult court. 18'1 The
juveniles were adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court, where they
received a disposition consisting only of detention in a juvenile facility
until age twenty-one. 185
In order to significantly reduce juvenile crime, the juvenile jus-
tice system must continue to expand its focus to include not only its
original goal of rehabilitation but also punishment and deterrence.
Abolishing the juvenile justice system, implementing community-
based treatment programs and allowing for blended sentencing are
178 See McLatchey, supra note 8, at 421.
179 See Hunt, supra note 98, at 673.
180 See id. at 673-74.
181
 See Ark. Buys Former County Prison, Will Keep School Snipers in Custody; State Can Fulfill
Law Requiring Separation from Other Offenders, BALT. SUN, June 12, 1999, at 4A; James Bar-
ron, Terror in Littleton: The Dead, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 1999, at A21; Judith Graham & Bob
Secter, Massacre Shatters School "A Suicide Mission," Cm. Tit' B., Apr. 21, 1999, at 1.
182
 See Ark. Buys Former County Prison, supra note 181, at 4A; Rick Bragg, Judge Punishes
Arkansas Boys ilqw Killed 5, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1998, at Al.
183 See Bragg, supra note 182, at 4A.
181 See id.
183 See Ark. Buys Former County Prison, supra note 181, at 4A.
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not, by themselves, the most effective means of reform." 6 Massachu-
setts' juvenile justice system, however, which combines the transfer of
jurisdiction over certain juveniles to adult court with blended sentenc-
ing for other juveniles, provides an example of a system that best pro-
tects society from violent crimes committed by juveniles by balancing
the goals of punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation. 1 B7
A. R6jecting the Unified and Community Based Theories
Abolishing the separate juvenile and adult justice systems and
creating a new unified system does not provide a practical or effective
solution to the problem of juvenile crime. 188 A unified justice system,
under which each defendant would be evaluated individually, would
remove elements of punishment and deterrence from the justice sys-
tem and individualization would make the determination of sentences
less swift and less predictable. 189 Additionally, providing this individu-
alized treatment for adult and juvenile defendants, and making age
just one of the factors influencing sentencing, would be costly, time-
consuming and inefficient)" Finally, if one reason for abolishing the
juvenile justice system is its lack of requisite resources to rehabilitate
juveniles effectively, how would juveniles benefit by broadening the
group of offenders eligible to receive individualized treatment?"' In-
deed, juveniles could "fall through the cracks" more easily in a unified
system)" Thus, a unified system would not further punishment, de-
terrence or rehabilitation of juvenile offenders.'"
Similarly, community-based treatment programs would not be the
most effective method for dealing with juvenile offenders. Although
the juvenile justice system was founded on the principle that juvenile
offenders should be treated differently because they cannot reason
right from wrong, the type of violence that juveniles commit has
changed radically from 1899, and community-based treatment pro-
grams practically eliminate the punishment and deterrence that is
186 See infra notes 188-206 and accompanying text.
187 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 58, 74 (1998).
188 See McLatchey, supra note 8, at 420-21.
189 See Ainsworth, supra note 26, at 949.
199 See McLatchey, supra note 8, at 420.
181 See id. (arguing that in a unified system, court dockets would be overcrowded and
courts would lack sufficient resources).
192 See id.
193 See id, at 421.
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necessary to stop violent crime committed by juveniles. 194
 In fact, in-
stead of focusing on the offense of the individual juvenile and on im-
posing a suitable punishment, this approach considers juvenile crime
a social problem that can be remedied only by treating the child
within his or her community. 195
 A two-tiered system thus would not
provide enough punishment, especially where the system would pro-
vide no transition between the community-based treatment programs
offered to juveniles under the age of eighteen and adult penalties of-
fered to juveniles age eighteen or older.
One of the problems with the current two-tiered justice system is
that the penalties imposed on juveniles and adults can be drastically
different, and community-based juvenile treatments would sharpen
this contrast by imposing very different penalties under the commu-
nity-based and adult tiers. 196
 For example, on November 10, 1990, in
Virginia, Douglas Thomas murdered James and Kathy Wiseman, the
parents of his girlfriend. 197
 Thomas killed the couple according to a
plan constructed by his girlfriend, Jessica. 198
 Because Thomas was sev-
enteen at the time of the murder, he was eligible for transfer to adult
court, where he was tried and sentenced to receive the death pen-
alty.199
 Jessica Wiseman, on the other hand, who masterminded the
murder of her parents when she was only fourteen, was tried as a ju-
venile because of her age and was sentenced to juvenile detention." )
Whereas Douglas Thomas was executed on January 10, 2000, Jessica
Wiseman was released in 1997. 201
 The community-based approach not
only would preserve, but also would widen the gap in such cases by
giving the juvenile a mere "slap on the wrist" through alternative
community programs, as opposed to the actual detention imposed on
Jessica Wiseman.
Community-based treatment of juvenile offenders not only would
fail to provide enough punishment for offenders, but also would fail
to prevent juvenile crime from occurring in the first place. One likely
14 See Cloud et al., supra note 7, at 64.
195 See Smith, supra note 152, at 965; Zierdt, supra note 30, at 427.
196 See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 427-28.
197
 See Bill Baskervill, Man Executed for '90 Killings; Supreme Court, Gilmore Reject Last-
Minute Bids for Stay, WASH. PosT, Jan. 11, 2000, at B2.
198 See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 419 S.E.2d 606, 608 (Va. 1992); Baskervill, supra
note 197, at B2.
199 See Thomas, 419 S.E.2d at 608-09; Baskervill, supra note 197, at 112.
299 See Baskervill, supra note 197, at B2.
201 See Baskervill, supra note 197, at 132; Va. Man Executed in Double Murder,  CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Jan. 11, 2000, at 2C.
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reason why community-based programs do not effectively prevent ju-
veniles from committing crimes is that these programs are targeted
specifically at repeat offenders or youth in certain impoverished ar-
eas. 202 Many of the recent violent juvenile crimes, however, were
committed by juveniles from middle-class, suburban backgrounds.20
For example, thirteen-year-old Seth Trickey—who was accused of
firing at least fifteen rounds from a semiautomatic weapon at a Fort
Gibson, Oklahoma middle school on December 6, 1999—was an
honor student, active in his church group, quiet and well-liked. 204 He
was part of a close, middle-class family living in a town of 4000, and he
had not had any previous contact with law enforcement. 206 The type
of violent acts committed by juveniles today, as demonstrated by Seth
Trickey's alleged shooting spree, is too severe and too capable of mass
harm to be ignored by community-based prevention efforts—yet, this
is exactly what is happening. 206 Providing community-based treatment
for all crimes committed by all juveniles, however, would be too costly
and difficult to administer. Thus, the community-based approach fails
as a preventive approach.
B. Massachusetts as a Model of Juvenile Justice Reform
To prevent juveniles from committing crimes, the juvenile justice
system should focus more on punishment and deterrence in addition
to rehabilitation. While blended sentencing should be part of the re-
form, it should be coupled—in certain cases—with an automatic
transfer of jurisdiction to adult court. Massachusetts' laws governing
juvenile justice provide a workable model of transfer of juvenile court
jurisdiction through legislative waiver, in combination with blended
sentencing for "youthful offenders," and thus effectively promote the
goals of punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation. 207
First, Massachusetts' legislative waiver and youthful offender stat-
utes help focus Massachusetts' juvenile justice system, in specific cir-
"2 See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 420-27.
003 See Graham & Sector, supra note 181, at 1; Rod Walton, Boy Enters Innocent Plea,
TULSA WORLD, Dec. 15, 1999, at 1. A series of school shootings occurred in Pearl, Missis-
sippi; West Paducah, Kentucky; Springfield, Oregon; and Jonesboro, Arkansas. See Bragg,
supra note 182, at Al.
204 See Arnold Hamilton, School Attack Suspect Seeks Juvenile Trial: Shooting "Aberrant" for
Boy, ',rulers Say, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Dec. 15, 1999, at 39A.
205 See id.; Walton, supra note 203, at 1.
203 See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 420-27.
2°7 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 58, 74 (1998).
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cumstances, on punishment of the offender. 208
 Legislative waiver in
Massachusetts mandates that any juvenile between the ages of four-
teen and seventeen accused of murder in the first or second degree
automatically be tried in adult court, subject to adult penalties. 2°9 Ju-
venile court does not retain any jurisdiction over these offenders. 21°
Transfer of jurisdiction to adult court provides the opportunity to
punish juvenile offenders more strongly because the adult court can
impose an adult sentence. 211
 In addition to the punishment imposed
by an adult sentence, the transfer of jurisdiction to adult court itself
provides punishment because it carries with it a stigma of serious
wrongdoing. Also, adult court proceedings are completely open to the
general public, unlike juvenile court proceedings, which remain
confidential to a certain degree.212
While helping to expand the focus of the juvenile justice system
to include punishment, Massachusetts' legislative waiver statute also
reasonably limits that expansion to older juveniles charged with the
serious crime of murder.213
 To allow a juvenile between the ages of
fourteen and seventeen who is found guilty of murder to receive a
juvenile sentence or even a blended sentence poses too great a risk to
the public's safety. A juvenile disposition could mean less than two
years in juvenile detention and then automatic release, and a blended
sentence could mean less than five years in juvenile detention with a
suspended adult sentence. 214
 Neither sentence imposes enough pun-
ishment for the adult crime of murder.
The need for more serious punishment for juveniles who commit
very serious crimes was expressed by Massachusetts state legislators,
district attorneys, the Attorney General, and the Governor, following
the initial decision of Judge Paul Heffernan to try fifteen-year-old Ed-
ward O'Brien as a juvenile for the gruesome murder of his neigh-
bor.215
 On July 23, 1995, O'Brien stabbed Janet Downing ninety-severs
208
 See id.
2" See id. g 74.
210 See id.
211 See id. § 72B. Thus, if the juvenile offender tried in adult court in Massachusetts
were found guilty of murder in the first degree, the sentence would be life in prison with-
out parole. See id. ch. 265, § 2.
212
 See MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 119, § 60A; JuvENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 94.
m See ch. 119, § 74.
214
 See id. § 58.
212 See Oddo, supra note 29, at 125-26; Ellen O'Brien, A Death Next Dow; BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 31, 1997, at 12.
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times just a few hours after he helped her carry in her groceries. 216
The judge's decision not to transfer jurisdiction over O'Brien to adult
court sparked public outrage and provided some impetus for Massa-
chusetts' 1996 legislative waiver statute, which was offered by State
Representative Paul Haley.217 Supporters of the legislative waiver stat-
ute, including republican Governor William Weld, maintained that
"society has an obligation to exact retribution . [and that] only by
facilitating the transfer of violent offenders to the adult system .. .
would retribution be properly attained."218
In addition to imposing punishment through legislative waiver,
Massachusetts law also effectuates punishment through its creation of
the category of "youthful offender. "219 Juveniles who were between the
ages of fourteen and seventeen at the time of the alleged offense and
who are accused of committing particular offenses may be treated as
youthful offenders for sentencing purposes. 2" Specifically, a youthful
offender must be accused of committing an offense that could be
punishable by imprisonment if committed by an adult. 221 In addition,
a youthful offender must have a prior commitment to the Depart-
ment of Youth Services (DYS) or be accused of committing either
specific firearm offenses or an offense involving the infliction or
threat of serious bodily harm.222 Jurisdiction over a youthful offender
remains in juvenile court and the youthful offender may receive one
of three punishments: an entirely juvenile disposition consisting of
commitment to DYS until age twenty-one; an entirely adult sentence;
or a blended sentence consisting of commitment to DYS until age
twenty-one with a suspended adult sentence. 223 The fact that a juvenile
court may extend juvenile court jurisdiction until age twenty-one, im-
pose an adult sentence, or impose a blended sentence on a youthful
offender provides additional punishment in the juvenile justice sys-
tem.224 Notwithstanding the variety of harsh punishments that may be
imposed against youthful offenders, the statute limits the impositions
of this sentencing authority to only the most dangerous youthful of-
fenders, by requiring a juvenile court judge to make a written finding
218 See O'Brien, supra note 215, at 12.
217 See Oddo, supra note 29, at 125-26.
218 See id. at 124-25.
212 See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 119, § 52.
12° See id.
221 See id.
222 See id, ch. 269, §10.
223 Sri, id. ch. 119, § 58.
244 See MASS. GEN. Lwvs ch. 119, § 58.
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that the punishment is necessary to ensure present and future public
safety. 225
Second, in addition to providing more focus on punishment,
Massachusetts' legislative waiver and youthful offender statutes also
expand the focus of the juvenile justice system to provide greater de-
terrence.226 The increased focus on punishment through legislative
waiver also provides deterrence because of the possibility that a juve-
nile will receive an adult sentence of life in prison for the crime of
murder. Additionally, the possible blended juvenile and adult sen-
tences or extended juvenile sentence should deter older juveniles
from committing crimes that would qualify them as youthful offend-
ers.
In addition to the deterrence provided by greater punishment of
certain juveniles, Massachusetts' legislative waiver statute also provides
deterrence because it automatically waives jurisdiction for certain ju-
veniles, thereby thrusting them into the center of a full-scale adult
criminal prosecution. 227 Legislative waiver sends a clear message that
any juvenile between the ages of fourteen and seventeen who is ac-
cused of committing murder will be tried as an adult. 228 In addition,
the statute's deterrent effect is heightened by the swiftness with which
legislative waiver is imposed. Contrary to judicial waiver, legislative
waiver is automatic. 229
 Waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction requires a
transfer hearing that can take up to a year to complete, during which
time witnesses may relocate and evidence may be compromised, mak-
ing it extremely difficult to prosecute the case. 280 In addition to pro-
viding faster transfers to adult court, legislative waiver also deters by
providing clear standards for transfer as opposed to prosecutorial
waiver, which gives prosecutors complete discretion to proceed in ju-
venile or adult court. 231 Prosecutorial waiver thus "invites arbitrary,
225 See id. In fact, in determining the sentence of a youthful offender, the judge must
hold a sentencing recommendation hearing at which he or she must, by statute, consider
certain factors such as the nature of the offense, the youthful offender's delinquency his-
tory (if any), the nature of services available through the juvenile system, the age and ma-
turity of the juvenile and the likelihood that he or she will avoid future criminal conduct.
See id.
226 See id. §§ 58, 74.
227 See	 § 74.
228 See id.
229 See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 416.
230 See Scott Harsltbarger & Carolyn Keshian, The Attorney General of Massachusetts' Bill
Relative to the Trial and Sentencing of Serious Juvenile Offenders, 5 13.U. Pun. INT. L.J. 135, 139
(1996); McLatchey, supra note 8, at 407.
231 See McLatchey, supra note 8, at 410.
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capricious transfer decisions on the part of the prosecutor"—whereas
legislative waivers are applied systematically and predictably. 252
Although more severe punishments and swifter, automatic trans-
fer to adult court under certain circumstances would seem to provide
deterrence, some have argued that juvenile offenders cannot be de-
terred because they do not conduct a cost-benefit analysis before
committing a crime, but rather, act based on emotion and/or peer
pressure. 2" This argument fails, however, because in many cases, ju-
veniles know that the crime they have committed is wrongful and are
thus presumably capable of being deterred. 234 For example, in 1989,
nine-year-old Cameron Kocher used a rifle to shoot and kill seven-
year-old Jessica Carr. 235 Even at age nine, however, Cameron knew that
his actions were wrong because he tried to hide the spent cartridge. 236
If juveniles who commit murder when they are as young as nine years
old try to conceal their actions, juveniles between the ages of fourteen
and seventeen are likely to be aware of the seriousness of the crimes
they commit and are capable of being deterred.
Nevertheless, part of the reason juveniles are not deterred by
punishments for juvenile crime might be that juvenile proceedings
are still fairly confidential in many states. 237 Transferring jurisdiction
to adult court, however, would allow these proceedings to be more
open to the public, increasing awareness among juveniles of the pos-
sibility of trial in adult court. 258 Thus, insofar as Massachusetts' youth-
ful offender statute allows youthful offender trials to be open to the
general public as if they were adult trials, the imposition of an adult
or blended sentence on a youthful offender may be publicized so that
more juveniles become aware that severe penalties can be imposed on
youthful offenders. 239 This greater awareness should deter more juve-
niles from committing crimes.
Finally, Massachusetts' legislative waiver and youthful offender
statutes not only focus more on punishment and deterrence but also
more effectively retain the original goal of the juvenile justice sys-
232 See id. at 410 n.94, 412.
233 See Zierdt, supra note 30, at 423; Hunt, supra note 98, at 656; McLatchey, supra note
8, at 421.
234 See Cloud et al., supra note 7, at 64.
235 See id.
"a See id.
" 7 See JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 101.
238 See id. at 95 (stating that proceedings in all adult courts are open to the public).
239 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 60A (1998).
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tern—rehabilitation.240
 Admittedly, legislative transfer of juveniles to
adult court does not permit those juveniles to be rehabilitated within
the juvenile system. The legislative waiver provision, however, is lim-
ited to o/derjuVeniles charged with murder who are not as amenable to
rehabilitation and who deplete the juvenile justice system's scarce re-
sources that could be used more effectively to rehabilitate amenable
youthful offenders or juvenile delinquents. 241 Allowing the juvenile
justice system to focus on the most amenable juveniles should hope-
fully prevent additional adult criminal activity in the long run.
In addition, the blended sentences that youthful offenders may
receive help rehabilitate juvenile offenders in several ways. 242
 First, a
youthful offender who receives a blended sentence remains commit-
ted to DYS until age twenty-one before the suspended adult sentence
can begin. 243
 Juvenile detention usually is limited to age eighteen, so
blended sentencing provides for a longer time period in which the
juvenile can reform within the juvenile system. 244 Second, the sus-
pended adult sentence provides added incentive for the juvenile to
reform.245
 Third, because youthful offenders include some juveniles
who are repeat offenders, blended sentencing gives them another
chance to rehabilitate within the juvenile system. 246 Finally, Massachu-
setts' youthful offender sentencing guidelines allow youthful offend-
ers to receive traditional juvenile "sentences," which make up part of
the individualized treatment upon which the juvenile justice system
was founded.247
CONCLUSION
According to prosecutors, Nathaniel Abraham told classmates
that he planned to shoot someone and practiced shooting at targets
before he shot and killed a complete stranger. After the shooting,
Abraham went home, watched television and bragged to a classmate.
The fact that Abraham was only eleven years old when he committed
this murder is reason enough for the public to be horrified. The fact
that Abraham already had more than ten run-ins with the police prior
240 See infra notes 241-247 and accompanying text.
241 Seech. 119, § 74.
242 See infra notes 243-247 and accompanying text.
243 Seech. 119, § 58.
244
 See id. § 72; Hunt, supra note 98, at 673.
245 See Mass. GEN. Laws ch. 119, § 58; Hunt, supra note 98, at 673.
246 See ch. 119, §§ 52, 58; Hunt, supra note 98, at 673.
247 See ch. 119, § 58; juvEN1LE OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 86.
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to his eleventh birthday is equally frightening. Perhaps most discon-
certing of all, however, is the fact that after committing murder, Abra-
ham will be held in juvenile detention until age twenty-one—perhaps
not even that long—and then will be released back on to the street.
Sentences such as this have been regarded by the public as too lenient
in a society where incidents of violent crime appear to be escalating.
State legislatures have responded to the public's concern by reform-
ing the juvenile justice system. These reforms have expanded the fo-
cus of juvenile justice from its original goal of rehabilitation to in-
clude punishment and deterrence.
A national debate has arisen over the types of changes that states
have made, which include transferring jurisdiction over juveniles
from juvenile court to adult court, imposing stronger sentences on
juvenile delinquents, and lessening the confidential nature of juvenile
proceedings. The debate includes proposals ranging from the abol-
ishment of the juvenile justice system altogether to the creation of
community-based treatment as an alternative to punishment in
prison. The most effective way to reform the juvenile justice system,
however, consists of a combination of juvenile and adult treatment of
juvenile offenders that properly balances all three goals of punish-
ment, deterrence and rehabilitation.
CHRISTINE CHAMBERLIN
